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There are a number of concepts available that aim to describe the borderlands in the 
West and South-west of China’s heartland. Fei Xiaotong spoke of the ‘Tibet-Yi 
Corridor’ and emphasised the historical and cultural connections created in these 
borderlands. Developing this notion further, Wang Mingming labels the region an 
‘intermediary zone’ between the ‘inner circle’ of the Chinese heartland and the ‘outer 
circles’ of foreign lands. And Wang Mingke uses the notion of ‘the Chinese periphery’ 
(huaxia bianyuan) to research the history of Han Chinese expansion westwards. What 
is common to these concepts is the tendency to look at the histories and cultures of the 
borderlands from the perspective of the centre. Even the concepts themselves express 
a centrist view, that puts the region in question in a position peripheral to those 
centres. In many senses – political, economic, cultural -  those regions certainly were 
peripheral to the centres of imperial expansion in the past, and they remain peripheral 
to the centres of the People’s Republic of China today, its government and its mega-
cities. But if academic observers simply reproduce the perspectives of such centres, 
the everyday social worlds of this region will never appear in their particularity, but 
rather as lesser fusions and replicas. Such are the risks in common discourses of 
‘Tibetanization’ and ‘Sinicization’, which over-emphasise the force and direction of 
processes of assimilation and hybridization, as if everything could be explained only 
in terms of ‘Tibet’ and ‘China’. 
 
Borrowing the concept of ‘convergence’ from the natural sciences, Tenzin Jinba 
proposes to look at the practical and pragmatic interactions that take place in such a 
border region. Unlike the concepts just cited, Jinba’s focus is decidedly not on the 
history of Chinese and Tibetan expansion, but on the present relations of the 
Gyalrongwa (who are registered as ‘Tibetans’ in the PRC) and the Qiangzu in Sichuan 
province. While both groups share a complicated and interlocked history, shifting 
between Tibetan, Qiang, Chinese, and Gyalrong identities, they forcefully assert their 
Qiang and Gyalrongwa/Tibetan identities, and they have done so in particular since 
the 2008 unrest. The contrasts they draw between themselves and other groups are 
essential to the assertion of their particular ethnic identity: both groups blame each 
other, insult each other, deny any cultural borrowing, and yet sometimes also share 
things with each other. Jinba describes their everyday politics of resistance, and in 
particular the use of strategic essentialisms, or in his words, ‘strategic marginality’ and 
‘dissimilation through analogy’. 
 
The concept of the ‘convergence zone’ is meant to emphasise both the hybridity of the 
border, and the particular ‘innovations, initiatives, and concerns’ of locals in this zone. 
Jinba acknowledges how notions of hybridity and creolization, in particular in 
postcolonial discourses, share many similarities with his emphasis on constant 
transcultural negotiation, the emphasis on shared histories, and the celebration of 
plurality. But he ultimately rejects those concepts, because in his view, they reproduce 
center-periphery relations, privileging the centre as a reference point, and neglecting 
different layers of centre-periphery relations. What Jinba’s brief discussion misses is a 
central point that authors such as Bhabha and Prakash have frequently made, namely 
that the ‘centre’ (be it ‘the West’, ‘Europe’, or some other entity) is, and always has 
been, hybrid too.  
 
In fact, though it is acknowledged that local identities are hybrid and that various 
centres are available, most of the ethnographic examples of identity dynamics 
described in the article are ‘strategic essentialisms’, the assertion of supposedly ‘pure’ 
identities of Qiang, Tibetan, and Gyalrong. The contrast drawn briefly with Scott’s 
everyday forms of resistance and Spivak’s strategic essentialism seems to not do 
justice to the complexity of their arguments; the main emphasis of Scott’s argument 
on the weapons of the weak was that they are more than just ‘coping mechanisms’.  
 
The weakest point of the article, however, is the reference to Willem van Schendel 
and James Scott’s concept of Zomia. As I read Jinba, he aims to correct Scott’s focus 
on escape and flight, wanting instead to focus on the constant engagements across 
border zones. Yet only half of the features of ‘Zomia’ – defined as stateless and 
characterized by great cultural and linguistic diversity – apply to the Sino-Tibetan 
borderlands. The Sino-Tibetan border has long been governed by states, and many of 
its mountains have been objects of worship for the surrounding Tibetan and Chinese 
populations – a feature strikingly absent from the ‘Zomia’ debates. If the mountains of 
Zomia are in these senses quite different from the Sino-Tibetan border, perhaps the 
implication of Jinba’s argument is the need for us to reconceptualise ‘Zomia’ as a 
‘convergence zone’. But even if we accept that this might help us appreciate the status 
of highland communities as ‘distinct local centers’ and better grasp ‘their tactics of 
engaging with external powers’, the specificity of the ‘convergence zone’ remains 
slightly opaque. And it is even further generalised in the conclusion, where it is 
argued that just about every geographical border or social margin could be 
reconceptualised as a ‘convergence zone’.  
 
It appears that the ‘convergence zone’ implies a particular perspective on borderlands 
and marginality, foregrounding continuous interaction and multiple centres. 
Convergence zones generate their own centres under local conditions of remoteness, 
resourcefulness and dominance from the more distant centres. Historically the more 
distant centres’ dominance over and dependence on the peripheral centres as 
mediators waxes and wanes or changes its form in other ways. But the geographical, 
social, and cultural differences between the Sino-Tibetan border, and other borders 
and margins surely also imply different politics and different strategies. It has been 
often noted that borders and margins can be places of creativity, and that seems to be 
also the main thrust of Jinba’s argument. But the kinds of creativity that appear in the 
Sino-Tibetan borderlands of Sichuan, in Hongkong, in Zomia, or in any ‘subculture’, 
take different historical forms and shapes, and perhaps these differences are elided if 
we describe them all as ‘convergence zones’.   
